Sunday, December 7, 2008

Tevillah Bizmana Mitzvah

Rambam in Shevisas Asor 3:2 -

וְכָל חַיָּבֵי טְבִילוֹת טוֹבְלִין כְּדַרְכָּן, בֵּין בְּתִשְׁעָה בְּאָב בֵּין בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים

According to the simple explanation of this halacha the Rambam is paskening here that tevillah bizmana mitzvah. This would mean that someone who needs to go to the mikvah (baal keri, zav, etc.) it is a mitzvah to go at the first opportunity. Thus, if that falls out on Yom Kippur or Tisha B'Av, even though there is usually a prohibition on washing one's body, the mitzvah is docheh the issur and thus the Rambam says one can go to the mikvah.

However, this Rambam stands against another Rambam which seems to hold that tevillah bizmana lav mitzvah:

Yesodai HaTorah 6:6 -

נִזְדַּמְּנָה לוֹ טְבִילָה שֶׁלְּמִצְוָה--כּוֹרֵךְ עָלָיו גֳּמִי, וְטוֹבֵל; וְאִם לֹא מָצָא גֳּמִי, מְסַבֵּב אַחֲרָיו. וְלֹא יְהַדַּק, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יָחֹץ--שֶׁלֹּא אָמְרוּ לִכְרֹךְ עָלָיו, אֵלָא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָסוּר לַעֲמֹד בִּפְנֵי הַשֵּׁם עָרֹם

Here the Rambam seems to hold that if the Shem Hashem is written on one's body he should even push off the tevillah in order to cover it up before he does the tevillah.

The source for both these Rambam's in the gemara in Shabbos 121a. If you look at Tosafos there (d"h Hachi) Tosafos points out a girsa issue. Tosafos prefer the girsa that even if one holds tevillah bizmana is not a mitzvah, still it is ok to be toveil on Yom Kippur or Tisha B'Av for people chayav tevillah. This would seem to be the position of the Rambam as well. Even though tevillah bizmana lav mitzvah, still one can be toveil on Yom Kippur or Tisha B'Av. The question is, why?
(See the Lechem Mishna in Yesodei HaTorah that points to this Tosafos as a possible resolution for the Rambam.)

If you look at the Rambam in Shevisas Asor in more detail it seems the Rambam himself answers the question:

ב מִי שֶׁהָיָה מְלֻכְלָךְ בְּצוֹאָה אוֹ טִיט--רוֹחֵץ מְקוֹם הַטִּנּוֹפוֹת כְּדַרְכּוֹ, וְאֵינוּ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וּמְדִיחָה אִשָּׁה יָדָהּ אַחַת בַּמַּיִם, וְנוֹתֶנֶת פַּת לִבְנָהּ. וְהַחוֹלֶה רוֹחֵץ כְּדַרְכּוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שְׁאֵינוּ מְסֻכָּן. וְכָל חַיָּבֵי טְבִילוֹת טוֹבְלִין כְּדַרְכָּן, בֵּין בְּתִשְׁעָה בְּאָב בֵּין בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים

The Rambam here bunches the halacha of chayvei tevillos with someone who needs to wash dirt off his skin or one who needs to bathe because he is sick. All of these cases of rechitza are muttar. Why? Apparently it is because only rechitza of taanug, only pleasurable bathing, was part of the issur. The Rambam is saying that rechitza of chayvei tevillos was never included in the issur of rechitza in the first place.

Thus, we have two ways of learning the heter for chayvei tevillos. One way is to assume that the mitzvah of tevillah is docheh the issur rechitza. This assumes tevillah bizmana mitzvah. The other approach, that of the Rambam, assumes that rechitza of chayvei tevillos is a different type of rechitza. This type of rechitza never was assured on Yom Kippur and Tisha B'Av in the first place.

Thursday, December 4, 2008

Believing in the Prophets

Rambam in Yesodei HaTorah Perek 8:
ו נִמְצֵאתָ אוֹמֵר, שֶׁכָּל נָבִיא שֶׁיַּעֲמֹד אַחַר מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּנוּ, אֵין אָנוּ מַאֲמִינִין בּוֹ מִפְּנֵי הָאוֹת לְבַדּוֹ, כְּדֵי שֶׁנֹּאמַר אִם יַעֲשֶׂה אוֹת נִשְׁמַע לוֹ לְכָל מַה שֶׁיֹּאמַר; אֵלָא מִפְּנֵי הַמִּצְוָה שֶׁצִּוָּנוּ מֹשֶׁה בַּתּוֹרָה, וְאָמַר אִם נָתַן אוֹת, "אֵלָיו, תִּשְׁמָעוּן" (דברים יח,טו): כְּמוֹ שֶׁצִּוָּנוּ לַחְתֹּךְ הַדָּבָר עַל פִּי שְׁנֵי עֵדִים, וְאַף עַל פִּי שְׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין אִם אֱמֶת הֵעִידוּ אִם שֶׁקֶר; כָּךְ מִצְוָה לִשְׁמֹעַ מִזֶּה הַנָּבִיא, אִם הָאוֹת אֱמֶת אוֹ בְּכִשּׁוּף וְלָאט

The halacha is that if a person comes along and says he is a navi, we don't believe him immediately. Rather, we must test the person. He has to make a prediction that comes true that establishes the he is in fact a navi. Once a navi establishes that he is a true navi by this method, we believe that he is a navi and we must listen to his words. There are more details to these halachos which can be found in the 7th through 10th chapters of Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah in the Rambam.

The Rambam there establishes that our belief as a nation in Moshe Rabbeinu's nevuah did not come about through the miracles that Moshe performed. For, as the Rambam says, anyone can fool someone with magic. Rather, the nation believed in Moshe Rabbeinu because they actually witnessed Hashem speaking to Moshe on Har Sinai. Miracles alone according to the Rambam cannot establish full emunah.

If so, why do we believe in a navi just because he performs a "miraculous" prediction. Perhaps he is fooling us with magic?

To this the Rambam answers here - yes perhaps it is so. Still, we believe the navi because that is the halacha. Just like the halacha is we believe two eidim even though they may be lying. Nevertheless, this is the standard the halacha established to believing eidim. So too, the standard the halacha has for believing a navi is based on performance of a miracle, despite the fact that he may be fooling us.

For this reason, a navi can never come along and argue with Toras Moshe Rabbeinu. The idea being that the only reason we believe the navi is because Toras Moshe says we must. Otherwise, the miracle alone wouldn't establish independent belief in the navi. So, obviously, if we are only believing the navi because it says to believe him in the torah, so certainly his word cannot overturn the word of the Torah.

[Note: the halacha is different if the navi is only overturning the halacha b'horaas shaah like Eliyahu at Har HaCarmel. See the Rambam inside for details.]

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

Akeidas Yitzchak - The Rambam's Unique Pshat

I found a Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim that gives a completely opposite pshat in Akeidas Yitzchak from the pshat you hear in almost every mussar shmooze on the akeidah. Absolutely mind boggling...

The famous question that is asked is, what is the big deal about the akeidah? If God told you to do something directly wouldn't you do it? Wouldn't you do anything for Hashem?

The famous answer that is given is that in fact Avraham wasn't a Navi at the level of Moshe Rabbeinu. Avraham's nevuah was at the level of Aspaklaria She'einah Meirah. He saw the word of Hashem, but not perfectly clearly. Therefore, the greatness of Avraham was that he didn't interpret the prophecy in a way that suited him better. He could have easily interpreted the nevuah in a more convenient fashion. But he didn't. Instead he went with the simple explanation, and proceeded with the akeidah.

If you want to see this pshat inside I found it in the Avi Ezri on Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 7:6 (last paragraph). But it's not only in the Avi Ezri. I have heard this pshat numerous times. The basic idea being that the lesson of the akeidah is not to ask questions, not to find excuses, but just to follow the simple word of Hashem.

Before we get to the Rambam, there is a glaring difficulty with this pshat. The halacha most certainly is safek nefashos l'hakeil. If Avraham wasn't 100% sure what Hashem was telling him, wouldn't the halacha dictate to be on the safe side and not kill his son?

Here now is the quote from Moreh Nevuchim (3:24):

The second purpose [of the akeidah] is to show how the prophets believed in the truth of that which came to them from God by way of inspiration. We shall not think that what the prophets heard or saw in allegorical figures may at times have included incorrect or doubtful elements, since the Divine communication was made to them, as we have shown, in a dream or a vision and through the imaginative faculty. Scripture tells us that whatever the Prophet perceives in a prophetic vision, he considers as true and correct and not open to any doubt; it is in his eyes like all other things perceived by the senses or by the intellect. This is proved by the consent of Abraham to slay "his only son whom he loved," as he was commanded, although the commandment was received in a dream or a vision. If the Prophets had any doubt or suspicion as regards the truth of what they saw in a prophetic dream or perceived in a prophetic vision, they would not have consented to do what was unnatural, and Abraham would not have found in his soul strength enough to perform that act, if he had any doubt [as regards the truth of the commandment]. It was just the right thing that this lesson derived from the akeida should be taught through Abraham and a man like Isaac. For Abraham was the first to teach the Unity of God, to establish the faith [in Him] etc.

Amazing. The Rambam here says that the lesson of the akeidah is specifically to teach us not to think that the prophets had any doubts regarding their nevuah, even if they did see in dreams or visions. The whole point is that since Avraham was even willing to kill his son based on this prophecy it shows that the prophecy was 100% clear to Avraham with no doubts as to its interpretation. Had there been any doubt, the Rambam even says that Avraham surely would not have followed through! This is the exact opposite pshat of the standard pshat I have heard numerous times in countless shmuessim and of the pshat given by the Avi Ezri. Not only is it the opposite pshat, it's actually the lesson being conveyed by the akeidah not to think this way!

Note one other point. The Rambam (a little earlier in the same piece) says there is another lesson to the Akeidah. The lesson being just how far one must go in the fear of Hashem. He must be willing even to give up his child. The Rambam says this lesson despite the fact that the Rambam says that the nevuah was 100% clear to Avraham. In other words, the Rambam isn't bothered at all by the question of the Avi Ezri, what is the big deal about the akeidah if Hashem said so? No, it is a big deal to the Rambam even if Avraham heard it directly from Hashem! It's still shows Avraham's greatness that he was willing to follow through with the akeidah.

Sunday, November 30, 2008

Kedushas Azkaros

אֲבָל מִין יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁכָּתַב סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה, שׂוֹרְפִין אוֹתוֹ עִם הָאַזְכָּרוֹת שֶׁבּוֹ, מִפְּנֵי שְׁאֵינוּ מַאֲמִין בִּקְדֻשַּׁת הַשֵּׁם, וְלֹא כְתָבוֹ אֵלָא וְהוּא מַעֲלֶה בְּדַעְתּוֹ שֶׁזֶּה כִּשְׁאָר הַדְּבָרִים; וְהוֹאִיל וְדַעְתּוֹ כֵּן, לֹא נִתְקַדַּשׁ הַשֵּׁם, וּמִצְוָה לְשָׂרְפוֹ, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא לְהַנִּיחַ שֵׁם לַמִּינִים וְלֹא לְמַעֲשֵׂיהֶם אֲבָל גּוֹי שֶׁכָּתַב אֶת הַשֵּׁם, גּוֹנְזִין אוֹתוֹ; וְכֵן כִּתְבֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ שֶׁבָּלוּ אוֹ שֶׁכְּתָבָן גּוֹי, יִגָּנְזוּ

Here the Rambam seems to state that theoretically if a non-Jew writes the name of Hashem with the intention that it is, in fact, Hashem's name - there is kedusha to that shem. It's only when the writing is done without the proper intention that there is no kedusha and that it must be burnt.


In his chiddushim on the Rambam in Hilchos Tefillin, Rav Chaim Soloveitchik points out that in this respect the lishma needed by ST"aM (Sefer Torah, Tefillin, and Mezuzos) is different than the lishma needed to give a shem Hashem kedusha (rendering it assur to erase that shem).


By ST"aM there is an additional din of lishma that is needed to make the Sefer Torah etc. kosher. A non-Jew is incapable halachically of creating this lishma, and is therefore unable to create a kosher sefer torah etc. However, there is no din of "lishma" per se that is needed by creating a Shem Hashem. Rather, the name just needs to be written "b'toras shem". It needs to be written with the intention that it is the name of Hashem, as opposed to some other word.

Rav Chaim also makes an additional interesting distinction. He explains that the standards for being a Shem Hashem as far as the issur mechica may be different than the standards needed for a Shem Hashem in a Sefer Torah. As far as issur mechika it could be that all you need is "b'toras shem". However, for a sefer torah the azkaros may need additional kavanah lishma as well.

Sunday, November 23, 2008

Shem HaMeforash

ב וְשִׁבְעָה שֵׁמוֹת הֶן--הַשֵּׁם הַנִּכְתָּב יוֹד הֵא וָאו הֵא וְהוּא הַשֵּׁם הַמְּפֹרָשׁ, אוֹ הַנִּכְתָּב אֶלֶף דַּאל נוּן יוֹד, וְאֵל, וֶאֱלוֹהַּ, וֵאלֹהִים, וְאֶהְיֶה, וְשַׁדַּי, וּצְבָאוֹת. כָּל הַמּוֹחֵק אַפִלּוּ אוֹת אַחַת מִשִּׁבְעָה שֵׁמוֹת אֵלּוּ, לוֹקֶה

Here the Rambam states pretty clearly his opinion that the shem hameforash is the tetragrammaton - the shem yud key vav key. He reiterates this in Moreh Nevuchim 1:61,62,63. There he also cites the gemara in Kiddushin 71a that states that there also exists a twelve letter name of Hashem as well as a 42 letter name. The Rambam there says that these longer names were probably more like phrases that described certain attributes of Hashem. Only the shem hameforash - the four letter yud key vuv key - is a name that can be said to denote more than mere attributes of Hashem. In some way that name even describes Hashem's essence. The Rambam says that we don't know one hundred percent what that name means, but it probably means something along the lines of "absolute existence".

There is a gemara in Sanhedrin 60a that discusses the laws of Megadef. In that gemara there is one part where the gemara says that even when one uses the four letter name of Hashem it is megadef. To which the gemara asks, what is the chiddush? The gemara answers that you may have thought you need the "shem rabba" the great name. So, the chiddush is even the four letter name suffices.

Rashi there says that the shem rabba refers to the 42 letter name of Hashem which he calls the shem hameforash. Rashi seems to learn the gemara in Kiddushin 71a that the 42 letter name mentioned there was the shem hameforash - against the shittas HaRambam. So the question is how does the Rambam learn the gemara in Sanhedrin? What is the Shem Rabba according to the Rambam.

The Rambam in Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:7 provides an answer:

יב אֵין הַמְּגַדֵּף חַיָּב סְקֵלָה, עַד שֶׁיְּפָרַשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׁם הַמְּיֻחָד שֶׁלְּאַרְבַּע אוֹתִיּוֹת שְׁהוּא אֶלֶף דֶּלֶת נוּן יוֹד, וִיבָרַךְ אוֹתוֹ בְּשֵׁם מִן הַשֵּׁמוֹת שְׁאֵינָן נִמְחָקִין--שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר "וְנֹקֵב שֵׁם-ה' מוֹת יוּמָת" (ויקרא כד,טז), עַל הַשֵּׁם הַמְּיֻחָד חַיָּב סְקֵלָה; וְעַל שְׁאָר הַכִּנּוּיִין, בְּאַזְהָרָה. וְיֵשׁ מִי שֶׁמְּפָרֵשׁ שְׁאֵינוּ חַיָּב אֵלָא עַל שֵׁם יוֹד הֵא וָאו הֵא; וַאֲנִי אוֹמֵר שֶׁעַל שְׁנֵיהֶם, הוּא נִסְקָל

The Rambam here states his opinion that by megadef one is chayav for both four letter names of Hashem, whether it be alef daled or whether it be yud key. Where does he get this halacha?

Apparently, he learns the gemara in Sanhedrin that the four letter name there was the name of Alef Daled. The gemara said that he chiddush is that you don't require the "shem rabba" - the yud key shem hameforash to be chayav - but rather either four letter name of Hashem suffices. Thus, the Rambam's chiddush that even the shem alef daled is chayav by megadef is a direct consequence of his shittah that the shem hameforash is yud key vav key.

[As a final note - in case you are wondering what happened to the well known 72 letter name of Hashem - see Breishis Rabbah that quotes R' Avina that Hashem redeems His children with his 72 letter name.]

*See the Tzafnas Paneach in Hilchos Avodah Zarah that seems to be indicating this pshat in the Rambam.

Saturday, November 8, 2008

The Middah of Avraham Avinu

If you ask most people what is the middah of Avraham Avinu without a doubt the majority would answer the middah of chesed. This is derived primarily from the story of hachnasas orchim in the beginning of Parshas VaYera and other midrashic sources that surround this episode. It is also derived from the pasuk in Micah 7:20 Titein emes l'yaakov chesed l'avrohom. The idea is that the midah of Chesed belongs to Avraham, Gevurah to Yitzchak, and Emes to Yaakov. It pays to note, however, that this is not the simple explanation of the passuk. The passuk is actually referring to the fact that Hashem should keep his promise to the Avos and return us to the land of Israel. As the Radak there explains, chesed refers to the fact that Hashem promised us the land as an act of kindness. Emes refers the the fact that he will make good on the promise to the fathers and deliver to the sons. Nevertheless, the Ramban (see Bereishis 17:22 and 31:42) offers the Kabbalistic interperetation that these middos belong to the avos - chesed being Avraham's middah. This is the source of the many Divrei Torah surrounding Avraham Avinu and the middah of Chesed.

However, if one were to ask the Rambam, what would he say is the middah of Avraham? The Rambam spells out the answer directly in two places. In Mitzvas Aseh 3, in the mitzvah of Ahavas Hashem, the Rambam says that Avraham Avinu was the paradigm of Ahavas Hashem. He bases this on two sources. First, the Navi says in Yeshaya (also the Haftorah of Parshas Lech Lecha) Avraham Ohavi. The Rambam takes this as a proof that Avraham Avinu had reached the high level of Ahavas Hashem. The Rambam then goes on to say a mashal. When one person loves another person they will do all in their power to get others to love that person. So too, Avraham Avinu tried to convince all those around him to love Hashem. As the pasuk says V'es hanefesh asher asu b'charan - that Avraham Avinu turned thousands of hearts and mind away from Avodah Zarah and towards the service of the Creator.

The Rambam then repeats this yesod in Hilchos Teshuva at the beginning of Perek 10 where he says that the ideal service of Hashem is Ahavas Hashem - the level of Avraham Avinu.

Thus, it seems clear that if one were to ask the Rambam what is the middah of Avraham Avinu, the Rambam would respond that Avraham Avinu had reached the lofty level of Ahavas Hashem.

Thursday, September 18, 2008

The Mitzvah of Anochi

The first mitzvah in Sefer HaMitzvos according to the Rambam is the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha. In the first few halachos of Mishneh Torah (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 1:1-6) the Rambam explains in detail what the mitzvah of Anochi means. The Rambam says that the mitzvah of Anochi basically is to know that there is a God that is in control of the whole universe. First, we should note that not all rishonim hold that Anochi is a mitzvah at all. In Sefer Hamitzvos the Ramban defends the opinion of the BeHag that Anochi is in fact not a mitzvah amongst the 613.

However, the Rambam has a solid proof that Anochi is one of the 613 mitzvos. The gemara in Makkos 24a says that there are 613 mitzvos. This idea is learnt from the pasuk of Torah tzivah lanu Moshe. Torah in gematria is 611. 611 of the 613 mitzvos were commanded from Moshe. Two were commanded from Hashem Himself -mipi hagevurah. Those two were Anochi and Lo Yihyeh. Thus, it is clear from the gemara that anochi is one of the 613.

Now, let us return to the Rambam's definition of Anochi. Many point out that when the Rambam talks about the mitzvah of Anochi in Mishnah Torah he uses the word leida - to know. A person has to know that there is a God. He does not say l'haamin - to believe. This is despite the fact that the translators translate Sefer HaMitzvos and Moreh Nevuchim with the word l'haamin. Is this a contradiction in Rambam? I don't know. However, I believe that the Rambam intentionally used the word Leida based on a passage in Moreh Nevuchim.

In Moreh Nevuchim the Rambam offers a novel interperetion of the gemara in Makkos. The Rambam says that when it says in the gemara that Anochi and Lo Yihyeh were heard by klal yisrael mipi hagevurah it doesn't mean they heard Hashem say those words. Rather, it means that those two mitzvos - the existence and unity of God - are logical. They do not require faith in a prophet such as Moshe Rabbeinu. Thus, all of klal yisrael had the same understanding of those two mitzvos as Moshe Rabbeinu. As the Rambam explains, knowing something through logic holds the same level of knowledge as knowing something through nevuah. Thus, it is specifically anochi and lo yihyeh that are known as opposed to believed. All other mitzvos are done because we believe in the prophecy of Moshe Rabbeinu. But, these two mitzvos are known independantly of that.

From this it seems clear that the Rambam intentionally uses the word leidah. The Ran in Derashos (drush 9) argues with the Rambam. He says mipi hagevurah literally means they heard those commandments from Hashem. He also disputes what the mitzvah of anochi is. He says that anochi isn't merely that there is a God. Rather, the mitzvah of anochi is to recognize that the God who took us out of Egypt gave us the Torah. The mitzvah really is that there is Torah min Hashamayim. As the Ran explains, knowing that there is a God is logical. However, how do we know He cares about are actions? How do we know about His hashgacha on the world? That requires Mipi Hagevurah - actually hearing it from Hashem Himself.

Thus, the Ran and the Rambam dispute the basic mitzvah of Anochi as well as the gemara in Makkos. In the Rambam Mipi HaGevurah is logic and the mitzvah of Anochi is simply knowing that God exists. In the Ran, Mipi HaGevurah means from the mouth of the Almighty - we actually "heard" Hashem say these dibros (whatever that means). And, the mitzvah of Anochi is about more than the mere existence of God - it is about the concept of Torah min Hashamayim - an idea that truly requires "mipi hagevurah".

It is interesting that the Rambam does use the terminology of emunah later in Hilchos Yesodei Hatorah when he discusses why klal yisrael "believed" in the nevuah of Moshe Rabbeinu. It seems clear that the Rambam is setting up two categories of mitzvos. Anochi and Lo Yihyeh are the foundations of the Torah and are known logically and independently of nevuah. All the other mitzvos of the 613 are known because we believe in the nevuah of Moshe Rabbeinu, which the Rambam discusses more in depth later in Mishnah Torah.